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 Ethics and the Translation of Holocaust Lives 
 
Peter Davies 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
You get a commission, do your best within the limited time available, hand it in, and 
then you are accused of having betrayed a whole people… 
- overheard at a conference on translating Holocaust writing 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At first glance, it might seem relatively straightforward to locate common ground 
between two fields of enquiry that work productively with significant ethical questions 
of fidelity or loyalty. However, when one starts to engage with the slipperiness of these 
terms, it becomes clear that the traditions of thinking about ethics in Holocaust Studies 
and Translation Studies often proceed from very different assumptions, even if the 
language they use is similar. Does this matter? After all, two different disciplines may 
well approach their objects of study in quite different ways, and the different approaches 
may simply provide contrasting perspectives on the same question. 
It matters because claims to ethical standards lie at the heart of both disciplines’ 
self-understanding; neither has shown any real willingness to reinvent itself as a purely 
descriptive discipline. Scholars of Holocaust testimony are concerned with questions of 
respectfulness towards the person and experiences of the victim-witness, and with 
sensitivity to how such experiences may be expressed – or not expressed – in language, 
as well as with the broader political aims of achieving justice, preventing repetition of 
the genocide, working against Holocaust denial, and ensuring that the voices of victims 
take centre stage in interpretation and commemoration of the Holocaust. 
Translation Studies has moved from a concern with ‘fidelity’ and linguistic 
equivalence – which are both, at root, ethical positions concerned with the authority and 
authenticity of the original text – to a much more complex series of concerns, in which 
the agency and responsibility of the translator are foregrounded: care for the original text 
and its author are counterbalanced by care for the status of the translator and for the 
potential effects of a translated text in the target culture. Of course, the translator of a 
Holocaust testimony will be working with a sense of ethical imperative, though what 
this means in practice may vary, depending on the nature and purpose of the task. But a 
translator may read the text differently to the Holocaust scholar, and have a different 
sense of what works or is necessary or appropriate in the target language and culture.  
The key clash here is between two contrasting approaches: one that places value 
on the voice of the victim above all other possible factors, that often thinks of translation 
in terms of loss and distance, and which tends to work either with a philosophical ethics 
drawn from thinkers such as Levinas (1989) or with an ethics of engaged listening drawn 
from accounts of the therapeutic encounter, as one finds in the work of Shoshana Felman 
and Dori Laub, or Dominic LaCapra (Felman/Laub 1992; LaCapra 1994); and another 
that understands translation as taking place within a network of influences, constraints 
and obligations towards many different parties, that sees the translator as a creative and 
engaged agent, draws attention to cultural context and difference, and that does not 
consider translated texts to be inferior versions of an original. 
Both Holocaust Studies and Translation Studies have, in their own ways, 
engaged with postmodern critiques of normative or universalizing ethics. Levinas’s 
work has provided inspiration for much of the discussion in Holocaust Studies, despite 
critiques by left-wing thinkers for its neglect of the political specificity of the 
communication situation (Eagleton 2009:227). Levinas’s work offers a congenial set of 
ideas for thinking about Holocaust testimony, as they place the ethical burden clearly on 
the reciprocal responsibility of an individual for the ‘Other’ in a relationship of 
obligation: “the face-to-face, concrete encounter with a unique human being for whom 
I am personally and inescapably responsible” (Shankman 2010:15). The encounter 
involves the radical questioning of one’s own position and ego in the face of the Other, 
the “laying down by the ego of its sovereignty” (Levinas 1989:85).  
Such a philosophical position provides a persuasive model for the necessary 
attitude when faced with a Holocaust testimony, though when discussing written 
testimony, it tends to downplay the complexity of the activities of writing and reading; 
imagining reading as an encounter with the Other can be used to short circuit the issue 
of the textual mediation of testimony. This tendency to wish away the fact of textuality 
with all it entails has consequences for how we judge translation, as I will show. 
 The discussion of testimony in Holocaust Studies provides a good example of 
how critiques of ethical norms can themselves make universalising claims: attempts to 
define Holocaust testimonies as texts that possess particular unique features requiring 
radical openness on the part of the reader in the encounter with the witness actually 
conceal instructions to the readers about how they are to read (see, for example, 
Eaglestone 2004). If a translation is required to emphasize particular features of a text 
under the influence of a theory of Holocaust witnessing, are we not also dealing with a 
normative ethics that elides differences between texts and the witnesses who produce 
them, ignores cultural difference and the needs of the target readership, and does not 
acknowledge the concreteness of the translation situation, the author status of the 
translator, and the translator’s conditions of labour? 
Nevertheless, it cannot be sufficient to propose for Holocaust testimony a purely 
situational ethics, as does Anthony Pym for translation more generally: for Pym, ethics 
is not about applying a universal ethics to a particular group, but “sketching a regional 
(ie. non-universal) ethics, intended only for a particular set of social activities, and thus 
self-consciously unable to make grand pronouncements on any wider humanity” (Pym 
2012:4) However, a sense of the cultural centrality of the Holocaust – its status as the 
defining event of a self-critical Western commitment to values of openness and tolerance 
– has meant that universal ethical questions are rightly at the centre of all discussion of 
Holocaust testimony, its reading and translation. 
A particular issue for translation is the fact that the act of composing a testimony 
has come to be seen as an ethical act in its own right, over and above any particular 
documentary value or knowledge that may be gained from the testimony: there is always 
an “excess of meaning” (“Bedeutungsüberschuss”, Weigel 2000:123) over and above 
the epistemological categories we use to ask questions of a text. The value of a text is in 
the individual nuance, and in the way it bears witness to the possibility or impossibility 
of articulating experience in language. 
Scholars have begun to grapple with the consequences for translation of this view 
of testimony, with much of the work attempting to apply concepts from Holocaust 
Studies – such as ‘witnessing’ – to the study of translation (for example, Glowacka 
2012). Work such as Glowacka’s is very useful, but it does not always coincide with the 
concerns and theoretical positions of Translation Studies. I would suggest that this has a 
range of potential consequences: it can matter for the way in which texts are translated 
and read; for how the history of the translation of testimonies is interpreted; and for how 
translations, and thus translators, are judged critically by those who have had their work 
translated as well as by scholars.  
When the ethical concerns of Holocaust Studies scholars are applied to the study 
of translations, the results can sometimes be unsatisfying: particular demands are made 
of translators – to be engaged in a committed way with the witness while never 
appropriating the witness’s voice, to respect the authenticity of the witness’s relation of 
their experiences, to be explicit about the translation strategies employed – that may 
clash with other realities of the translation situation, for example the time and money 
available, the requirements of a publisher or target readership (for example, for 
‘readability’), or the translator’s expert understanding of target culture conditions. 
Spending time as a translator in intense conversation and exchange with a witness, as 
well as engaging with the history of scholarship about Holocaust testimony and 
witnessing, is perhaps an ideal situation, but it is a far cry from the reality for most 
professional translators.  
This, then, is a further area of concern: the critique of translators and translations 
by scholars who are acting in the name of loyalty to the witness, but who may not feel 
an ethical concern for the conditions under which translators work, instead 
underestimating the extent to which the stability, security and time to devote to a project 
are dependent on a privileged institutional context: a case of mistaking the opportunities 
of privilege for standards of moral action (what Anthony Pym (2012:3) calls “ethics for 
translators with alternative means of support”)?  
Pym here usefully contrasts professional ethics with philosophical ethics, in a 
way that is of relevance to discussion of the translation of Holocaust testimonies. Most 
discussion of testimony and translation proceeds from the most significant philosophical 
discussions of the issue, taking as its starting point the work of Walter Benjamin (1973), 
George Steiner (1998), or Levinas, or Primo Levi’s thoughts on translation (Alexander 
2007): here, concern for the preciousness of the voice of the witness is combined with a 
theory of untranslatability, and accompanied either by a melancholy awareness of the 
losses entailed by translation, or accusations of deliberate distortion. In these cases, 
‘loss’ in translation can be compared to the loss of the witness him/herself, and is an 
object of mourning. Distorted translations that make too many concessions to the target 
readership can be read as examples of the assimilation of victim cultures to the 
requirements of the non-victim majority culture, and of the effacement of difference 
(Seidman 1996). 
Such discussion inevitably – and perhaps deliberately – ignores certain 
fundamental issues connected with translation as a professional activity: the insights of 
philosophical ethics work with a rather hazy conception of context and agency, and do 
not consider questions of professional ethics, standards and values, agreed codes of 
conduct, commercial considerations and career opportunities, etc. One might argue, with 
some justice, that the questions raised by ethical enquiries into Holocaust testimonies 
are important enough that some pragmatic issues may need to be set aside, but the 
method of comparing source and target text, interpreting certain aspects of the 
difference, and attributing the difference to a translator-figure may miss parts of the 
process that are ethically relevant. 
Pym puts it like this: “If you describe translation as a linguistic process revealed 
by the abstract comparison of two texts, translators become the product of that 
comparison, like anonymous but necessary agents” (Pym 2012:135). The ‘translator’ 
thus becomes a composite figure eliding all the other agents at work in the translation 
process; the critic assumes a form of ethical agency that can be interpreted ideologically 
and simply, in terms of labels like ‘distortion’ or in terms of theories drawn from 
Holocaust studies. What this means is that the ‘translator’ of a Holocaust text is the point 
of interface and exchange between critical disciplines, an abstract mediating figure that 
allows for concepts to be exchanged, but has little to do with the realities of the 
translation situation, the translator’s role, or with the concrete individual or individuals 
at work on the text. 
 To sum up, one can say that the translator of a Holocaust testimony is working 
in a field of tension between philosophical ethics and professional ethics; between 
ethical considerations arising from the encounter between thinking about the Holocaust 
and postmodernism, and an ethics that sees translators as agents working in concrete 
sociological conditions, requiring a clear commission and non-exploitative working 
conditions; between an emphasis on the encounter with otherness, trauma or 
incomprehensibility and an understanding of translation as a mode of interpretive 
reading for a specific purpose; between a rejection of totalizing interpretations and a 
concrete process of analysis and choice in which professional ethics requires target-
cultural expertise; between a demand for fidelity to the witness text and an informed 
understanding of how problematic such a notion is. 
 
 
2. Situational or Universal? 
 
Even if we restrict our considerations to the translation of written testimonies (which 
may only represent a fraction of the translation activity that has shaped, and is continuing 
to shape, our understanding of the Holocaust) it becomes clear that the sheer variety of 
texts and translation situations makes it very difficult to generalize about what one 
should expect of the translator and how one should judge their work.  
How, for example, could we find common ground between the following fairly well 
known examples?  
 
 As the Soviet Army advanced, retaking the territory it had lost during the German 
invasion, the writers Il’ya Erenburg and Vassiliy Grossman, along with many 
others, collected testimonies from Soviet Jewish survivors with the aim of 
publishing them as The Black Book of Soviet Jewry; working at great speed, and 
facing real uncertainty as to whether the Soviet authorities would actually permit 
publication, testimonies that were given in Yiddish or Ukrainian were translated 
into Russian, ensuring that the text appears to reflect a monolingual situation.  
 In 1958, Elie Wiesel, along with the editor of the French publishing house 
Éditions de Minuit, Jérôme Lindon, produced a radically rewritten French 
translation of Wiesel’s Yiddish memoir, …un di velt hot geshvign, entitled La 
Nuit (Wiesel 1956; 1958) The text, which forms the basis of all further 
translations, presents a testimony in a startlingly stark style, which has exerted a 
key influence on definitions of testimony since (far more than the very extensive 
Yiddish memoir literature that the text originated in). The text was now available 
to a larger, non-Yiddish speaking audience in a world language, but it also takes 
a generalizing view of the original’s context, which was rooted in a specifically 
Hassidic cultural, religious and linguistic context. The text is brought nearer to 
the reader through compromises with French understandings of Jewish religion, 
rather than the reader being encouraged to step outside his or her own sphere of 
experience in engaging with the text. 
 The first German edition of the diary of Anne Frank (1950), translated by 
Anneliese Schütz, has been criticized for particular compromises with its target 
audience by making substitutions that diluted the text’s accusatory tone; for 
example, substituting the word “Nazi” where Frank had “German”, and various 
other things (see Schroth 2014). 
 
These three cases show texts by Jewish victims being translated into international 
languages for the sake of a new, largely non-Jewish readership: do they all simply entail 
betrayal on the part of the translator, or assimilation to an ethics that makes a claim to 
universality while effacing the specificity of the victim? Or might a closer analysis of 
the specific situation lead us to understand the necessity for the translation strategies at 
that moment? Is comparing the original text with the translation really the only useful 
way of approaching the ethical questions raised by these texts? 
What about translations that excerpt or fragment texts and fillet them for 
information, as historians and other scholars constantly do, putting them to use in a very 
different context and for a different purpose to that for which the testimonies were 
originally given? The scandalized allegations of tendentious translation made against 
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen for his Hitler’s Willing Executioners (Goldhagen 1996) show 
both that this is potentially a problem and that we do not have enough knowledge to 
make judgments about it beyond flinging accusations (see the discussion in Ball 
2008:19-44). Does breaking down a testimony text into quotation-length chunks, 
whether translated or not, not also falsify it in important ways? There are very many 
testimonies that go on long and complex journeys through translation and remediation, 
during which they lose all connection with their original language and context: the name 
of the witness, usually in the absence of the name of the translator(s), functions as a 
shortcut back to the original, allowing us to assume that the layers of mediation are 
irrelevant.  
Are these examples all inadmissible, or are they potentially understandable and 
acceptable given the context, the pressures on the translator, and the purpose for which 
the translation was made? If the translations show a professional awareness of the target 
context, for example by taking account of genre expectations, has the original been 
distorted and the witness betrayed? What happens if the translator notices different 
things in the text (such as narrative strategies or systems of metaphor) to the scholar of 
Holocaust writing? Is the only ethically acceptable mode of analysis one that proceeds 
from current thinking in Holocaust Studies? What criteria do we actually have for 
differentiating between these cases, beyond simple – and theoretically naïve – 
comparisons of original and translation that construct a ‘translator’ as scapegoat for a 
multitude of sins? 
A purely situational ethics with a clear understanding of cultural context and 
difference would seem to be the clearest way forward, but that would mean abandoning 
many of the fundamental precepts of our thinking about the Holocaust, the witnesses, 
and the texts that they have produced. One cannot simply break the Holocaust down into 
situation-dependent fragments and individual moments of cultural exchange. After all, 
was the concept of the Holocaust as a universal, culture-spanning event not developed 
precisely because the tendency to concentrate on individual national or group memories 
actually plays down the enormity of the genocide and effaces the experiences of the 
victims? The universal concept of the Holocaust has allowed us to see it not just as an 
assault on Poland, France, or the USSR, or as an appalling escalation of ‘war crimes’, 
but as something new, as an assault on the Jews as Jews and as a universal negation of 
supposedly universal values. Abandoning this for a purely situational ethics might 
threaten the very universal ethical significance of the events themselves. 
 We are, therefore, left with a dilemma. But I would propose treating it as an 
opportunity for thought, rather than as an aporia. I would propose that critical 
engagement with ethical questions should consider three distinct areas of investigation: 
comparative analysis of source and target text in a way that considers critically what it 
might mean to translate a Holocaust testimony in an ethical manner in a concrete 
situation; the concrete sociological analysis of the translation situation and the agents 
involved; and an understanding of how the ‘translator’ and ‘translation’ are interpreted 
and constructed in theory. In this way, one can avoid unsatisfying critiques of ‘distortion’ 
in favour of a more complex view of the translation process and the agents involved; and 
one can engage with the question of what it means for Translation Studies concepts to 
be used uncritically in Holocaust Studies, and vice versa. 
 
 
3. Uniqueness and Translation 
 
One should perhaps start with a straight question: assuming that we accept the idea of 
the uniqueness of the Holocaust, must we also accept the uniqueness of Holocaust 
testimonies as texts? Are Holocaust testimonies so special as texts that a good, 
professional translation job is not sufficient? Does the translator’s very professionalism, 
based on training, experience and expert knowledge, perhaps also entail an undesirable 
distancing, noncommittal ‘objectivity’ or even déformation professionelle, treating the 
text – and thus, by extension, the witness and his/her experience – as an object of study 
or just another job? If, as a postmodern ethics might suggest, treating a text as an object 
upon which actions are carried out simply perpetuates a subject-object split that defines 
the object in such as way that it serves the needs of the subject, then the translator fails 
in his/her ethical duty: there is no radical openness, no risk to the security of the subject 
in the face of the other, and no genuine sense of encounter. It also shows no awareness 
of potential power imbalances in the translation situation, in which the victim can be 
victimized again by having his/her voice ventriloquized by another. 
This position relies on a set of assumptions, however, that often remain 
unspoken. For example, it assumes that reading a text by a witness is an activity 
comparable to experiencing direct oral testimony. A sense of ethical responsibility 
should perhaps urge us to treat an autobiographical text by a survivor as in some way a 
proxy for that individual, but the downgrading of the significance of text and reading, 
making them a poor substitute for voice and listening, is potentially problematic. 
If writing a text as a witness – that is composing or collaborating on the 
composition of a complex written artifact in a particular context, for a particular 
audience and under particular conditions – is not seen as an activity in its own right, but 
as one that stands in for a more valuable activity – giving oral testimony – then the 
translator’s job becomes difficult. The translator is not simply translating the text in front 
of him/her according to the commission, but is also mediating an encounter with the 
witness: if the text is transformed into an object that is more than simply a text, then the 
translator becomes more than a translator, too. 
Demands may be made of the translator that he/she works according to a set of 
ethical procedures that include ensuring that translation strategies are clear and that the 
voice and positioning of the translator are always explicit: in other words, that the 
translator does not ventriloquize the witness in such a way that the reader may mistake 
the translator’s voice for the witness’s. Through an encounter with a witness text, the 
translator becomes him/herself a ‘secondary witness’, in the formulation of Laub and 
Felman (1992:15), with a responsibility to ensure that a translated text is the site of an 
act of witnessing. 
Such an ethical demand is useful, and has produced some valuable scholarly 
work, as well as a range of striking translations that attempt to take this kind of ethical 
stance (Deane-Cox 2013; Degen 2008). Nevertheless, there are a number of hidden 
assumptions that make such demands problematic. For example, it assumes that 
translating a written text – a complex, mediated textual artifact in which certain 
linguistic, structural, narrative, interpretative and representational choices have already 
been made – is a similar process to eliciting an oral testimony from a witness in an 
intimate situation. The notion that a written text allows the witness opportunities for 
reflection, mediation, complexity, narrative shaping, prioritizing, symbolism, analysis 
of self and situation, and deliberate choice without pressure of time or questioning – in 
other words, that a written text is a different mode of testimony of equal value, rather 
than a poor substitute for oral testimony in the presence of the witness – is downplayed 
here. Further, if I am reading a testimony text, I am not enabling an ‘act of witnessing’: 
however engaging, moving, challenging, horrifying I find the text, what I am doing is 
reading about an act of witnessing that has already taken place, not participating in it. 
This creates a particularly difficult situation for the translator: what, actually, is he or 
she translating? 
Sharon Deane-Cox has proposed a way forward. Although she suggests that 
translators are ‘secondary witnesses’ in the sense described by Laub and Felman, she is 
careful to acknowledge the textuality of a written testimony (in this case, Robert 
Antelme’s L’Espèce humaine), asking that the translators respect the choices made by 
writers, listen to their voices, and render their illocutionary intentions as closely as 
possible: 
 
[T]he translator must resist the displacement (or misplacement) of what the 
survivor knows and cannot know into his or her own epistemological frames, in 
order to avoid betraying the illocutionary force and instability of the original 
testimony on the one hand and to allow the reader some access to destabilizing 
effects of trauma on the other (Deane-Cox 2013:315). 
 
There is little to disagree with here, except perhaps that the same analysis of the 
translation could have been performed without the apparatus of secondary witnessing: 
is listening to the voice different from reading carefully and thinking about style, 
coherence, etc., as a good translator always will? One can argue, as Deane-Cox does, for 
a reading that is ethically inflected from the start, as an appropriate response to a 
Holocaust testimony, and which therefore prioritizes particular strategic choices at the 
expense of others: in this case, conveying the ‘destabilising effects of trauma’. This is 
compelling, but we should be open to the possibility that the translator’s reading may 
simply be different to the scholar’s, perhaps for bad reasons, but perhaps also for very 
good and necessary ones.  
We should also remember that the claim to locate ‘trauma’ in a testimony is not 
like the process of medical diagnosis of an individual, but is ultimately a mode of literary 
analysis that is informed by a set of current (and not universally accepted) theories and 
tools that borrow their language from psychiatry, and that therefore itself displaces 
aspects of the survivor’s text into a new epistemological frame. To put it bluntly, there 
is a risk of employing a contemporary epistemological framework and its associated 
reading strategies in order to seek and find trauma in a text whose author may have had 
very different priorities.  
Nevertheless, and despite these caveats, to dismiss the ethical force of the role of 
the translator as a mediator of an act of witnessing would be to dismiss a vital and 
productive tradition of thinking about Holocaust testimonies that has important 
challenges for Translation Studies scholars. 
A sense of the uniqueness of the situation when translating a Holocaust 
testimony, and therefore of the task of the translator, explains why prefaces and 
commentaries so often emphasize translators’ commitment, personal closeness to the 
witness, or emotional involvement: the translator’s professionalism is equated with a 
distant, non-committed attitude or even simple commercial motivation. But could one 
not equally argue that a good, professional translation done by an expert with no 
immediate connection with the witness might be fairer to the text in an all-round way 
than one done by a close acquaintance? 
An interesting recent example is the retranslation into English of Elie Wiesel’s 
La Nuit (Wiesel 1958) by his wife Marion Wiesel (Wiesel 2006). The new text is 
advertised as being translated “in the language and spirit truest to the author’s original 
intent”,1 and the new foreword by Elie Wiesel explains that the new translation is an 
improvement on the older one as his wife understands his ‘voice’ better (Wiesel 
2006:vii-xv). Certainly, the collaboration between the two has made for a fascinating 
new text, which restores some of the language of Jewish mysticism that had been lost in 
the French translation of Wiesel’s original Yiddish memoir (Wiesel 1956), but if one 
asks which translation is more ‘faithful’ to La Nuit then things become more 
                                                 
1  See http://images.macmillan.com/folio-assets/readers-guides/9780374500016RG.pdf [accessed 
12.3.2015] 
complicated. Comparing the two English translations, one finds that the earlier 
translation, by Stella Rodway (Rodway 1960), remains closer in style, vocabulary and 
syntax to the French text, while Marion Wiesel’s is in many respects a fresh narration, 
making claim to authenticity through personal connection and listening to the voice. 
Which, then, is more ‘faithful’? 
There are interesting questions to ask here about whether it is possible to 
reconstruct an original ‘intent’ some 50 years later, or whether the new translation might 
not instead be a response to more contemporary concerns (for example, the emphasis on 
the witness’s ‘voice’ above all else). Creating a new original authorized by Wiesel 
himself is a different procedure from translating the text in order to give the English-
speaking reader an impression of its considerable literary qualities. Both are entirely 
legitimate responses, but to suggest that the former is better than the latter on the basis 
of the closeness of the translator to the author demonstrates an unwillingness to engage 
with the specifics of the translation situations and the different aims of the translators 
and translation, not to mention changing conceptions of Holocaust testimony and 
appropriate ways of reading it. 
One is left with a number of questions. Is the ‘intention’ of the witness – 
assuming that we can reconstruct it at all – more important than the actual text that forms 
the basis of the translation? What do we do with a poorly written text (after all, for many 
witnesses this may be the only published text that they ever produce, and most of the 
theory scholars draw on has been developed in readings of texts with a high degree of 
literary sophistication)? Does the translation intend to provide a new audience with an 
impression of the original, or to introduce them to the witness? And to what extent can 
the translator (or publisher) take an expert view of the reception context of the 
translation, and formulate the text accordingly?  
  
4. The Location of the Translator 
 
If standard approaches to defining an ethics of translating Holocaust testimonies leave 
the translator in an impossible position, then it seems to me that we need to find new 
ways of understanding what translators do and why in undertaking this important work. 
An ethics that demands the impossible may be attractive for a discussion of the 
Holocaust that stresses the incommensurability of the Holocaust with modes of 
representation in language, but it leaves us with little practical or critical understanding 
of the translator’s role and task.  
Such an ethics also makes it difficult to acknowledge the manifold achievements 
of translators in creating, disseminating, preserving, and passing on knowledge about 
the Holocaust over many years and in many different cultural and political contexts. In 
my view, any discussion of translation in a Holocaust context that aims to make any 
universally valid claim needs to acknowledge this achievement and appreciate its 
consequences, which go much deeper than the rather limited arguments over fidelity to 
the witness’s voice might suggest. 
What a translator does, or does not do, is always grounded in a complex, but 
concrete situation. Translation analysis can attempt to reconstruct this situation using 
sociological models (see Kershaw 2010; Wolf and Fukari 2007), and one can then begin 
to make judgments about the conditions under which the translation was made and the 
options that were open: this is a precondition for making genuinely informed ethical 
judgments. Contemporary theoretical discourses about Holocaust representation may be 
part of the discursive background to the translation situation, and may be taken into 
account by one or more of the agents involved in the translation process; such discourses 
may or may not be the most important influence on the translation situation. However, 
it may be that the situation in which the translation is interpreted (potentially at a later 
date and by a scholarly audience for whom it was not originally intended) is dominated 
by discussion of theories of Holocaust representation; this is natural enough, since texts 
are always interpreted in a new context, but an understanding of translation contexts can 
help to guard against judgments drawn from simple ST-TT comparisons, and which 
construct an abstractly understood translator-figure operating in a realm of absolute 
liberty and responsibility. 
There is little work as yet on the study of translators of Holocaust testimony, as 
opposed to translations. We therefore have little information about who does it, why, 
and under what conditions. Some generalisations are possible, however, based on 
readings of translators’ prefaces and other paratextual documents. A significant 
proportion of translation work has always been carried out within victim groups and 
through the generations of the families of survivors: the international spread and 
linguistic diversity of victim communities has meant that interlingual translation has 
from the very beginning been a vital means of communicating and comparing 
experiences, forming and challenging interpretations, building group identities, and 
promoting knowledge and understanding amongst non-victims. Oral and written 
communication are both vital in this respect. One could therefore hypothesize that the 
majority of translation work has been done in private and informal contexts, under 
conditions that it is now difficult to reconstruct many years later: however, such 
translation activity is still very much a feature of survivor groups today, and there would 
be important work to do to investigate the translators’ self-understanding and conception 
of their task. 
A key borderline along which ethical conceptions are negotiated is that between 
victims and their representatives, and non-victims: this can occur in acts of testimony 
intended to inform the ‘world’ about the nature and extent of Nazi crimes, in legal 
testimony, in testimony texts intended for broad public consumption or for particular 
contexts (educational, commemorative, etc.). Historians and other scholars regularly 
translate victim texts that they are using to underscore particular points, thus putting the 
testimonies to use in a new context and for a new purpose. Translators may act 
differently, and experience very different working conditions, in these different cases: 
they may be amateur or professional, working for pay or on a voluntary basis, depending 
on the situation and on who has commissioned the translation. They may be established 
literary or historical translators who are commissioned to translate a testimony, 
translators located through an agency, or translators specializing in Holocaust-related 
work; they may or may not belong to the specific victim community themselves. There 
is usually an element of political or ethical commitment to their work, but even where 
they work on a voluntary basis without the need to earn a living through the work, 
various kinds of capital are likely to play a role: status within a group and/or raising the 
profile of a group, reinforcing (or challenging) group identities, recognition of expertise, 
acknowledgment of ethical commitment, etc. 
It remains to be investigated how distinct the motivations of professional and non-
professional translators are, and how their motivations might affect the translations they 
do (if at all). Do these motivations clash with the wishes of publishers, commissioning 
bodies, and the victims themselves? We can gain some information from prefaces and 
other commentaries – these are valuable as a source for understanding motivation, but 
they don’t tell the whole story, and they only help us in cases where the translator has 
sufficient status to be able to talk about the task. We should also be open to the possibility 
that discussion of motivation in paratexts or conversations with translators is in fact often 
only tenuously connected with the actual outcomes of translation, rendering ethical 
judgments complicated.  
If translators act as (often unacknowledged) mediators not only across linguistic 
cultures, but also within victim groups and between such groups and broader 
readerships, then their work often only becomes genuinely visible when something goes 
wrong. Controversies about translation often arise at the sensitive borderline between 
victim groups and the broader societies in which they are located. This border is the site 
of difficult negotiations and conflicts around ethical problems: who has the right to 
interpret or to judge? What is the relationship between the testimony text and the victim 
whose experiences it documents: does it stand in for the victim, as well as being a text 
produced by the victim? What is testimony for, and what is one allowed to do with 
testimony texts? How is the truth of a text to be understood, and what is most important 
about it? Is the identity of a victim, in terms of their chosen mode of cultural self-
expression, likely to be diluted or distorted when translated for the benefit of a new 
readership, and are the feelings connected with this related to the status of a particular 
minority in a particular society? 
The difficulty of these issues make it all the more important to identify the precise 
location of the translator, to reconstruct the translation situation carefully, and to identify 
the values that influence interpretations of, and reactions to, translations. Simply 
comparing source and target text and complaining about ‘distortion’ will not do, but 
neither should one dismiss fears about distortion and misappropriation as simply naive. 
After all, such fears originate in deeply held beliefs about identity and truth, anxieties 
about forgetting and the precariousness of victim group identities in modern societies, 
not to mention the intense emotional investment in texts by individuals who have 
suffered greatly. Nevertheless, our aim is, ultimately, to increase knowledge and 
understanding, and so we should not shy away from coherent and persuasive challenges, 
even when they are emotionally difficult. However, this means that as scholars we need 
to reflect on the ethical consequences of our own positions, as well as those of the 
translators. 
  
 
 
5. The Scholar’s Loyalties 
 
If we are to discuss the translator’s ethics, then a further level of reflection is required, 
namely on the ethical concerns of the scholar discussing the translation of Holocaust 
testimony. This is an expanding field of study, with ethical questions at its core, but there 
may be certain blind spots that are worth considering, in particular as regards the 
scholar’s understanding of the status of the translator. 
 Translation scholarship has a vital role to play in making visible the contribution 
of translators to our understanding of the Holocaust, while also working through the 
problems and issues that translation brings with it: making visible is still a key task of 
the translation scholar working in Holocaust Studies, even if the process of 
understanding can raise uncomfortable questions about authenticity, mediation, and 
witnesses’ ownership of the expression of their experiences. If the translator is invisible, 
or uncredited (which still happens occasionally even now in publications of collections 
of testimonies: for example Lewis 2012), or the effects of translation are excluded from 
discussion of texts, then our role is clear. 
 Beyond this, translation scholars tend also to work with a sense of ethical loyalty 
to the witnesses themselves: through careful reading of translations against originals, 
they guard against distortions and expose the interests and ideological motivations that 
affect how testimony texts are translated and read in translation. In other words, scholars 
can feel they are acting as guardians of the integrity of the witness text, and through that, 
of the witness him or herself. They often make a case for particular modes of translation 
that involve political and ethical commitment, making explicit and explaining the 
translation strategy, and, where possible, spending extended periods of time with living 
witnesses in order to ensure that the translation corresponds as closely as possible to the 
wishes and ‘voice’ of the witness in the new language. Other approaches to translation 
are, by implication, inferior or less respectful, with the translator adopting a posture that 
effaces the individuality of the witness and potentially puts the experience at the service 
of a particular agenda or purely commercial considerations. 
If, for example, a scholar criticizes a translation in terms of an ethical injunction 
against effacing or ventriloquizing the Other, then it is surely relevant to ask whether the 
critique itself constructs the ‘translator’ as an object of study that effaces the complexity 
and specificity of the situation, elides the translator with the various other agents and 
interests involved, and functions simply as a focus for the discussion of theoretical 
questions. Further, a scholar’s view of the nature of the original text – which may be 
informed by theories drawn from Holocaust Studies, typically working with ideas of 
trauma, incommunicability or fragmentation – can only ever itself be a partial 
interpretation that is designed to support a particular theoretical position; the danger here 
is that the scholar constructs an interpretation of the original that serves to support the 
critique of the translation, rather than to deepen understanding of the text. 
We can ask, bluntly, what we should do if we discover that the translator - as a 
particular kind of reader, working with different assumptions and perhaps in a different 
time and/or place - has simply interpreted the text in a different way? I would suggest 
that, for the scholar, reconstructing that reading and the conditions under which it was 
made is a more enlightening exercise for studies of Holocaust testimony than simply 
assessing the translation against our own preferred theoretical approach to testimony.  
This issue is compounded by the fact that scholars are far more likely to take an 
interest in translations of a small and unrepresentative number of well known, complex, 
challenging and literary testimonies that reflect in a sophisticated way on questions of 
trauma, language and communication: as scholars trained in Holocaust Studies, we tend 
to assume the existence of ‘trauma’ in such texts, and to seek out examples that back up 
this belief. A translator whose reading of the text is different may attract our criticism. 
However, reading a text in terms of ‘trauma’ depends on an array of theoretical positions 
that reflect recent thinking about the Holocaust: constructing a view of the original based 
on such preoccupations in order to critique a translation may not be far away from what 
the translator is accused of doing. 
 Ethical critiques of translation practice are often compelling and useful, but they 
do have blind spots, in particular when it comes to the social position and working 
conditions of the translator, to the complexity of translation processes, and to the variety 
of agents that are involved. They also tend not to engage with translators’ codes of 
professional ethics or the theory and practice of translation current in the place and time 
in which the translation was made. Instead, they prefer to work with the philosophical 
armory of Holocaust Studies, which is held to have a universal relevance. Of course, 
ethical universals are vital for critiques of practice in context, and a thoroughgoing 
cultural relativism would be inappropriate for studies of the Holocaust, but an analysis 
of the translation of a testimony should at least attempt to reconstruct the understanding 
of translation, of the Holocaust, and of the nature and purpose of witnessing that the 
translator and the other agents involved are working with. 
 A possible response might be to say that the translator should not take on a 
translation of a testimony in a situation in which he or she does not have time to act as a 
‘secondary witness’. This is of course always an option, if one has the economic 
resources to turn down work. But if we think for a moment about how impoverished our 
stock of translated testimonies would be if such a rule had held since 1945, then raising 
it to a general principle seems unhelpful. The exception to this is the process of working 
with a still living witness who wishes to engage with the translation process: here, the 
preciousness of the witness’s presence trumps everything, and time must be found. 
As scholars, we should be loyal to translators as well as to the witnesses. It is 
easy, and perhaps also flattering, to adopt the role of guardian of the original text, and 
thus of the witness, against ideological distortion and misappropriation. Of course, this 
is useful and important work, as scholarship must be about unconditional truth seeking 
or it is worthless; but it must also turn its critique on itself and investigate whether its 
own concepts and methods do not also perhaps reflect the blind spots of its own 
privileges. 
The translator should not become a scapegoat, but should be understood as a 
concrete individual identifiable in a particular context and network of relations. I would 
therefore suggest that studies differentiate clearly between the translator as real-world 
individual and ‘translation’ as focus for theoretical discussion in which ideas about 
meaning, authenticity, witnessing, experience, trauma, and cultural difference are 
negotiated. Until we know more about the conditions under which Holocaust testimonies 
have been, and still are, translated, one should endeavor to keep these fields of enquiry 
separate. 
Understanding the real-world translation situation and the translator’s role and 
conditions of agency within it will itself entail defining and reconstructing the situation 
using sociological models, and so is by no means a value-neutral or theory-free 
‘commonsense’ exercise. But since this work has not been done, we do not know what 
the outcomes will be.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Ethical considerations are a fundamental part of the discussion of the creation and 
mediation of knowledge about the Holocaust – a claim to neutrality would in itself be 
ethically dubious – but we need also to be aware both of the limitations of our 
understanding and of the dangers of using analytical categories that are unable to deal 
with the complexity of translation in context. The term ‘translation’ is currently used in 
studies of Holocaust writing as an analogy for all manner of things beyond the rendering 
of an utterance from one language to another: it is used to refer to remediation, transfer 
between genres, movement of texts from one place to another (by analogy with the 
‘translation’ of relics), and even the process of trying to render (or ‘translate’) experience 
into language. These processes are all of defining interest in the study of the Holocaust, 
but bringing them together under the label ‘translation’ has real consequences, in that it 
simplifies the study of interlingual translation as a field in itself, and marginalizes 
methods drawn from Translation Studies. This may arise from an insistence on the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust, meaning that the ideas, theories and methods used to 
analyse testimony texts must also be unique: approaching testimonies from a purely 
Translation Studies perspective would imply comparability with other fields of 
investigation, and thus ultimately be seen to relativize the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
itself. 
These are issues that should be approached with care. We could perhaps begin 
by acknowledging that reading a testimony text for translation will, to a greater or lesser 
extent, involve reading it like any other text to be translated, for structure, narrative, 
cultural specificity, tone, register, underlying structures of metaphor, allusion, and many 
other things. It is a reading directed towards a specific purpose, but it may well be a more 
comprehensive reading than an analysis that concentrates on the preoccupations of 
theories arising from Holocaust Studies. By implication, translation shows that 
testimony texts are comparable with other kinds of text: this may be one source of the 
anxiety about translation, and it is something that we should be circumspect about. 
Nevertheless, in order to understand how and why texts have been translated, 
and how this has contributed to our knowledge about the Holocaust and its 
consequences, we need to acknowledge the complexity, specificity and autonomy of 
translation as a skilled practice, and to investigate who the translators have been and the 
conditions in which they have worked. Neither Translation Studies nor Holocaust 
Studies can be made into purely descriptive disciplines – there are ethical positions 
implicated in all description, after all – though description, contextualisation, analysis 
are still important as we still do not know enough about what happens to Holocaust texts 
in translation to be able to make absolutely robust ethical judgments, let alone 
prescriptions. 
If the task of scholarship is to work on behalf of the witness and to ensure that 
we clear a space for the voice to be heard, then we should still proceed with care and 
avoid scapegoating translators. The spaces in which voices speak – including our own – 
is never neutral or value-free, after all. A “principle of maximum awareness of ethical 
implications” is a useful imperative for all involved in translating testimonies and 
reading these translations (Jones 2004:725) But there are other tasks ahead, too, most 
importantly the necessity to make translation visible as a defining element in the 
production, mediation and interpretation of knowledge about the Holocaust. Alongside 
that, we need to understand the translators themselves, their motivations and methods, 
and their understanding of their task, as well as the conditions under which they work. 
Finally, since the work of documenting the failures of translators has a fair headstart, a 
good step forward would be to begin documenting their achievements, too. 
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